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RECENT CASES
Criminal Law-Habeas Corpus-State Prison Regulation
Prohibiting Prisoner from Preparing Petition for Fellow
Inmates Held Invalid in Absence of Alternative Means of
Assistance
Petitioner, an inmate in the Tennessee State Penitentiary, was
placed in solitary confinement for repeated violations of a prison
regulation forbidding inmates from assisting other prisoners in the
preparation or filing of writs of habeas corpus.' Petitioner filed a
motion in federal district court seeking release from solitary
confinement and access to law books in order to resume aiding
illiterate prisoners, unable to obtain other counsel, in the preparation
of their petitions. Construing the motion as a petition for habeas
corpus, the district court ordered petitioner's release from solitary
confinement.2 Respondent prison officials contended that regulations
for the administration of prisons, absent interference with
fundamental rights, are not subject to review by the courts and that
petitioner's activity constituted unauthorized practice of law, which
the individual states have sole authority to regulate. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that since
prisoners in a penal institution have no federally protected right to the
assistance of fellow inmates in preparing or filing petitions of habeas
corpus, the prison regulation did not conflict with any federal right of
habeas corpus3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, reversed. Unless the state provides some reasonable alternative
to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction
relief, it may not enforce a regulation barring inmates from furnishing
assistance to other prisoners in the preparation of petitions for habeas
corpus. Johnson v. A very, 394 U.S. - (1969).
Federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to entertain
I. Tenn. State Prison Reg.: "No inmate will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid
another, either with or without a fee, to prepare Writs or other legal matters. . . . Inmates are
forbidden to set themselves up as practitioners for the purpose of promoting a business of writing
Writs."
2. The district court held the prison regulation invalid because it effectively barred
illiterate prisoners from access to federal habeas corpus and conflicted with 28 U.S.C. § 2242
(1964). Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
3. Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1967).
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prisoners' claims of civil rights violations by prison authorities This
reluctance is based on the belief that the management and discipline
of penal institutions is the responsibility of the executive department
which "must be allowed to exercise a largely unfettered discretion in
deciding what security measures are appropriate," 5  Despite this
judicial unwillingness to supervise prison administration, official
practices or regulations denying or obstructing prisoners' access to the
courts have been invalidated' under the due process7 and equal
protection' clauses of the Constitution. However, .prison regulations
which merely- make access to the courts more difficult9 have generally
been upheld in deference to the policy of noninterference with matters
of prison discipline.fConsequently, the validity of prison regulations
limiting the times and places in which inmates may engage in the
preparation of legal documents has been upheld." Similarly, efforts to
4. See generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). Several recent decisions have
shown, however, that some courts are becoming more willing to intervene. See, e.g., Pierce v. La
Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966);
United States ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Redding v. Pate, 220
F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963). See also Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The
Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985, 987 (1962).
5. Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1963) (upholding prison authorities'
prohibition against practice of Muslim religion by inmates); accord, United States v. Marchese,
341 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72
(4th Cir. 1964); Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1964); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d
906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Siegal v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
6. A state may not limit the writ to prisoners able to pay a $4 filing fee, Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961). Prison authorities have been denied authority to screen habeas corpus
petitions, Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), to surpress the filing of prison appeals, Dowd v.
United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951), or to require prisoners to find persons outside
of prison to file habeas corpus petitions on their behalf, White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 n. I
(1945); United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 976 (N.D. Ill. 1944), affd,
146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).
7. E.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (court apparently relied on this clause
without so stating); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920
(1964); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
8. E.g., Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U.S. 255 (1942); Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
9. Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1957); Austin v.
Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304, 307 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (restriction on times during which inmates may
work on legal documents). The following prison regulations have been sustained: prohibition
against carrying on legal work in cells, Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); Austin v. Harris, supra; limitation on the percentage of a
prisoner's personal funds that may be used to purchase legal materials, Hatfield v. Bailleaux,
supra.
10. The purpose of these regulations has been to discourage the "informal practice of
law" by inmates. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862
(1961); Oregon exrel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957).
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establish a right of access to legal materials have been resisted by the
courts on the ground that legal materials are unnecessary for effective
access to the courts," since "a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
properly contains allegations of fact alone, and . . .legal arguments
are not a proper part thereof.' ' 2 The Supreme Court has, however,
emphasized the importance of the constitutional right of habeas
corpus 3 and has insisted that post-conviction proceedings be more
than a mere formality. 4
Some authority for the proposition that inmates may aid indigent
fellow prisoners in preparing habeas corpus petitions is found in
section 2242 of the Judicial Code, which provides: "Application for a
writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the
person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his
behalf."'5 The latter phrase, added in 1948, was intended to reflect
"the actual practice of the courts,"'" which generally permitted one
person to apply for habeas corpus on behalf of another where the real
party in interest lacked physical access to the courts. 7 Prior to the
instant case, however, federal courts had not directly faced the
question of one prisoner's right to assistance from another. In Siegel
Ii. E.g., Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 433 (D. Md. 1966); Hatfield v.
Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 639-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); Grove v. Smyth,
169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958). Compare United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Prasse, 225 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (denial of access to state procedural rules violates fourteenth
amendment).
12. Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1957).
13. E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713
(1961); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939); Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
14. It has been held that the state must furnish indigent prisoners with a transcript of
lower court proceedings for purposes of appeal. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (state
statute requiring indigent prisoner to pay $4 filing fee before application for writ of habeas
corpus is denial of equal protection); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1964) (emphasis reflects 1948 amendment). The district court held
that the prison regulation conflicted with the express words of § 2242 authorizing the filing of
a petition "signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting
in his behalf." The court interpreted the statute as permitting assistance from a layman in the
preparation of an application for habeas corpus. Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966).
16. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1947).
17. Thus lawyers or relatives have been allowed to prepare and verify petitions for persons
threatened with extradition or deportation, Collins v. Traeger, 27 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1928);
United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152 (C.C.S.C.N.Y. 1908), or for members of
the armed forces, United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915 (2d Cir. 1921); Exparte
Dostal, 243 F. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
18. 88 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1949), affd, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
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v. Ragen,18 a federal district court stated summarily that a prisoner
has no constitutional right to practice law by way of preparing habeas
corpus petitions for other prisoners. More recently, the Ninth Circuit,
in Wilson v. Dixon,.9 refused to consider a habeas corpus petition
prepared and filed by a fellow inmate. Conceding that section 2242
recognizes the right of one person to sue for habeas corpus on behalf
of another, the court noted that the right exists only when the petition
explains the necessity for assistance. While defining the need for
counsel in pre-trial stages," the Supreme Court, without regard to the
possible existence of a federal right to assistance in applying for
habeas corpus, has neither indicated that constitutional rights could
be protected through representation by a layman, nor that
representation by counsel in the post-conviction period is an
indispensable element of constitutional due process .2  Furthermore,
even if the right to assistance in applying for habeas corpus were to be
established, the courts have traditionally recognized the right of
individual states to regulate the practice of law within their borders,
22
although the Supreme Court has recently limited this state right to
some extentP
The Court in the instant case began with the fundamental
proposition that "access of prisoners to the courts .. .may not be
denied or obstructed.'' 24 Admitting that the disciplinary
administration of state prisons is a state function, the Court asserted
19. 256 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958).
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
21. Several circuits have stated the advisability of appointing counsel in the post-
conviction period. Taylor v. Pegelow, 335 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1964); Dillon v. United States, 307
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962); United States ex rel Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.
1960). A California court has specifically stated that no federal constitutional right to counsel
exists prior to the filing of a petition indicating a prima facie case. People v. Shipman, 62 Cal.
2d 226, 229, 397 P.2d 993, 996-97, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1965). In Barker v. Ohio, 330 F.2d 594
(6th Cir. 1964), the court denied the existence of a right to counsel in a coram nobis proceeding.
22. E.g., Konigsberg v. California State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366
U.S. 82 (1961); In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Emmons v. Smitt, 149 F.2d 869 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945); Niklaus v. Simmons, 196 F. Supp. 691 (D. Neb. 1961).
23. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (Court invalidated
state bar regulation prohibiting labor union from providing legal services to union members);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen V. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)
(state bar regulation prohibiting labor union from providing legal services infringed upon
exercise of first amendment guarantees in asserting rights under the Safety Appliance Act and
the Federal Employer's Liability Act); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Court
invalidated state regulation of legal profession which prohibited NAACP from providing legal
services to Negroes contesting racial discrimination).
24. 394 U.S. -(1969).
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that in instances where state regulations applicable to inmates conflict
with paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights, the
regulations may be invalidated. Here Tennessee had adopted a prison
regulation which, in the absence of any other source of assistance for
illiterate or poorly educated prisoners, effectively prevented such
prisoners from filing habeas corpus petitions. Consequently, the
Supreme Court endorsed the district court's conclusion that, since the
initial burden of presenting a claim for post-conviction relief usually
rests upon the prisoner himself, "[flor all practical purposes, if such
prisoners cannot have the assistance of a 'jailhouse lawyer' their
possibly valid constitutional claims will never be heard in any
court.'"' The Court concluded that although prison "writ writers"
may menace prison discipline and burden the courts with their
unskillfully drafted petitions, a state may not abridge the right to
apply for a writ of habeas corpus. Since Tennessee did not offer a
reasonable alternative to the assistance provided by other inmates and
failed to demonstrate that its regulation had not effectively deprived
those unable to prepare their own petitions of the constitutional right
of habeas corpus, the regulation was held invalid. Concurring, Mr.
Justice Douglas asserted that when the government fails to provide a
prisoner with legal counsel and the prisoner's illiteracy prevents him
from acting in his own behalf, the adequate presentation of
meritorious claims requires mutual prisoner assistance." In dissent,
Mr. Justice White conceded that without some kind of assistance
prisoners will be effectively denied 'access to the courts but expressed
concern that prisoners will still be effectively barred from the courts if
the help received from other inmates is not "reasonably adequate for
the task."" Arguing that jailhouse lawyers ca.use unacceptable
disadvantages to their clients, create severe disciplinary problems, and
impose serious burdens on the courts, he suggested that the states
provide reasonably adequate assistance to prisoners preparing post-
conviction papers.28
The instant decision is a progressive step toward recognition of
the practical realities of the petitioning prisoner's situation. As
25. Id. at - , quoting from Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784 (M.D. Tenn.
1966).
26. 394 U.S. at.
27. Id. at - (White & Black, JJ., dissenting).
28. The dissent apparently ignores the fact that at present no alternative means of
assistance exist. While the suggestions made are noble, they do nothing to solve the issue at
hand. It seems preferable that one prisoner is helped and the rest disappointed by the jailhouse
lawyer then all being disappointed by the total lack of assistance.
1969]
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indicated by the district court many prisoners are incapable of
preparing without assistance an intelligible petition on their own
behalf. 9 Such assistance cannot readily be obtained from outside the
prison because the same disabilities which prevent the preparation of a
meaningful petition by inmates will also hinder their efforts to contact
an attorney to represent them, and many attorneys will not
voluntarily represent a convict.30 Even if the problem of effective
communication with attorneys were solved, the prisoner desiring to
petition has neither the right to appointed counsel nor the capability
to retain paid counsel 3 ' Thus, in the absence of prisoner assistance, his
ability to petition depends upon the availability of free legal services.
However, public and voluntary services are already overburdened and,
because they are concentrated at the pre-trial and trial stages of the
judicial process, cannot therefore afford satisfactory habeas corpus
assistance. Further, assistance in the preparation of habeas corpus
applications is not provided when the original trial of a prisoner was
not handled by the public defender. 2 Thus, the federal right to habeas
corpus becomes meaningless without prisoner assistance.
Three arguments have been advanced against allowing mutual
prisoner assistance. One disadvantage of such assistance is that it
creates discipline problems within the prison. Prison' officials have
testified that "aggressive inmates of superior intelligence exploit and
dominate weaker prisoners of inferior intelligence" if they are allowed
to engage in law practice." While the problems of discipline might
29. Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). See also Note,
Constitutional Law: Prison "No-Assistance" Regulations and the Indigent Lawyer, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 343, 347-48, 360-61.
30. The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a dearth of lawyers who are willing to
take on unprofitable and unpopular cases. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963).
31. The Supreme Court has often held that a state may not interpose any financial
restrictions between an indigent prisoner and his right of access to the courts. Long v. District
Court, 385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (state may not withhold the privilege of appellate review
because a prisoner lacks funds to buy atranscript); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961)
(state may not make payment of a filing fee a prerequisite to obtaining a petition for habeas
corpus).
32. E. MANCUSO, THE PUBLIc DEFENDER SYSTEM IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 5 (1963).
See also Gardiner, Defects in Present Legal Aid Services and the Remedies, 22 TENN. L. REV.
505 (1952); Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Dejendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579 (1963); Note, Representation of Indigents in California-A
Field Study of the Public Defender and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522
(1961).
33. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961)
(this problem was cited with approval as grounds for denying prisoners access to outside legal
materials). In his dissent in the instant case, Mr. Justice white stated: -[i]t is not necessarily the
best amateur legal minds which are devoted to jailhouse lawyering. Rather, the most aggressive
1000 [VOL. 22
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justify the regulation of the activities of jailhouse lawyers, the complete
prohibition of their activities is unjustified unless reasonable
alternatives are provided. In view of the present inadequacies of free
legal services there is now no such alternative. A related objection is
that prisoner assistance constitutes unlawful practice of law by
laymen. The traditional argument for prohibition of unauthorized
practice emphasizes protection of clients from ill-trained or
unscrupulous advisors, but the application of this rationale to the
denial of assistance among prisoners in the preparation of habeas
corpus petitions overlooks several important considerations. Prisoner
assistance in this area, whatever the danger of incompetent and
unscrupulous practitioners, seems preferable to the alternative of no
assistance. The absence of objection to the use of lay volunteers to aid
the poor in obtaining welfare and solving domestic problems seems to
negate the principal argument. Considering the inadequate supply of
lawyers, there are many ministerial legal functions, such as filing
welfare applications and grievances and applying for habeas corpus,
that could and should be performed by laymen aiding the indigent3
Also, since a habeas corpus petition should contain only a factual
account of the petitioner's claims, an acceptable petition can be drafted
by persons with no legal knowledge or training. The unauthorized
practice argument, therefore, does not justify an absolute restraint on
prisoner assistance. A final argument which can be raised against
prisoner assistance is that it may increase federal court work-loads.
While prisoner assistance would probably increase the total number of
petitions, the time required to separate valid petitions from groundless
claims may be reduced, if such assistance improves the intelligibility
of petitions, and therefore the increased burden of sifting through
many applications may be offset by the legitimate claims discovered.
The court work-load problem could be alleviated if the
recommendation of the Federal Judicial Conference Committee on
and domineering personalities may predominate. And it may not be those with the best claims
to relief who are served as clients, but those who are weaker and more gullible. Many assert that
the aim of the jailhouse lawyer is not the service of truth and justice, but rather self-
aggrandizement, profit, and power." 394 U.S. at - . See also Krause, A Lawyer Looks at
Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 371 (1968); Spector, A Prison Librarian Looks At Writ-
Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 365 (1968); Note, supra note 29; Note, Legal Services for Prison
Inmates, 1967 Wisc. L. REV. 514, 520-22; Note, Prisoner Assistance on Federal Habeas Corpus
Petitions, 19 STAN. L. REV. 887, 89 n.31 (1967).
34. Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 145-49 (1967) (Douglas J., dissenting). See also
Samore, Legal Services for the Poor, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 509, 515-16 (1968); Sparer,
Thorkelson & Weiss, The Lay Advocate, 43 U. DET. L.J. 493, 510-14 (1966).
1969] 1001'
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Habeas Corpus that district courts adopt a standardized form for
habeas corpus applications to aid both the petitioner and the courts in
processing the complaint was adopted?5
In light of the recent Supreme Court decisions invalidating state
regulations of the practice of law which restrict the exercise of
constitutional rights,36 and the footnote of the Court in the instant
case affirming those decisions,3 7 the prohibition of prisoner assistance
under the guise of the state's right to regulate the legal profession is
apparently invalid if such prohibition prevents prisoners from
exercising their federal right of habeas corpus. If illiteracy and
substandard intelligence of prisoners does in fact prevent them from
preparing their own petitions and from contacting an attorney, the
prohibition of prisoner assistance has the effect of denying prisoners
access to the courts. As an alternative to allowing spontaneous
jailhouse lawyering the Court might have required the state to provide
adequate assistance to those who cannot prepare their own petitions.
Such a requirement might best be met by Mr . Justice White's
suggestion of a system of regulated trustees of the prison who would
advise prisoners of their legal rights?8 A regulated system of prisoner
assistance would ensure that inmate clients receive genuinely helpful
advice and would reduce the disciplinary problems caused by jailhouse
lawyering. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of prisoner
assistance and the shortcomings of any alternatives, prisoner
assistance may prove to be the only presently workable solution to the
lack of legal counsel available to the prisoner. The jailhouse lawyer is
readily available and is likely to be recognized as a familiar and
trustworthy peer, as contrasted with an unknown attorney. On
balance, therefore, until feasible alternatives for helping illiterate
prisoners are devised and implemented, prisoner assistance represents
the best accommodation of the requirements of effective prison
administration and the needs of prisoners unable to assert their own
rights because of personal disabilities.
35. Applications for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review of Sentences in
the United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363, 421 (1963). For a good discussion of the standardized
habeas corpus application form see Note, Prisoner Assistance on Federal Habeas Corpus
Petitions, 19 STAN. L. REv. 887, 893-94 (1967).
36. See note 23 supra.
37. 394 U.S. at - n. 1, citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (see note 23
supra). The Court stated: "The power of the states to control the practice of law cannot be
exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights." Id.
38. 394 U.S. at-.
[VOL. 221002
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Securities Regulation--Corporation as a Director for the
Purposes of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
Plaintiff, a shareholder of the issuer corporation,' sought to
recover under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 2 the
"short-swing" profits realized by an acquiring corporation from the
purchase and sale of the issuer's stock within a six month period. The
stock had been purchased in contemplation of a merger while the
chief executive officer of the acquiring corporation was a director of
the issuer corporation and was sold one month after his resignation as
director of the issuer corporation3 Following the issuer's refusal to
prosecute, plaintiff initated this action4 alleging that the chief
executive officer was a deputy of the acquiring corporation, and that
the corporation was therefore a director within the meaning of section
16(b).5 Although the district court agreed that liability turned on the
question of deputization, it held the evidence insufficient to establish
the corporation's intent that the chief executive officer represent its
interest in the issuer.6 On appeal, the Second Circuit, held, reversed on
1. This was not a derivative suit; the action was brought to enforce a section 16(b) remedy
created by the Securities Act of 1934. Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964): "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information which may have been obtained by such . . . director. . . . any profit realized by
him from any purchase and sale, of [a] security of such issuer . . . within any period less than
six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer . . . . This subsection shall not
be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time
of the purchase and the sale."
3. Defendant Bunker, chief executive officer of Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) served as
a director of Sperry Rand Corp. (Sperry) from April 29, 1963, to August 1, 1963. Martin
accumulated 801,300 shares of Sperry stock; 101,300 were purchased during Bunker's
directorship. Between August 29, 1963 and September 6, 1963, Martin sold all of its Sperry
stock. Thus the stock purchased during Bunker's directorship was sold within 6 months of the
purchase date.
4. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), provides: "Suit to recover
such profit may be instituted . . . in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days'after request.
5. Martin had not acquired more than 10% of Sperry; thus, in order to be within the
ambit of § 16(b) it must be either a director or an officer of Sperry.
6. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In arriving at the
determination the court made several relevant findings of fact. A memorandum in Martin's file
containing information on the condition of Sperry was determined to be nothing more than
information readily available to the public, and while the mem6randum was admissible, it was
to be accorded little weight. The approval by Martin's board of Bunker serving on Sperry's
board was only a deputization to perform director's duties, not to represent Martin's interest.
Furthermore, Bunker's letter of resignation to General MacArthur only indicated that being a
Sperry director was too demanding on Bunker's time. The court also noted that: Bunker had a
fine reputation as an engineer; Sperry, not Martin, took the initiative to encourage Bunker to
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the facts and remanded.7 A corporation which places a director on the
board of a target corporation is a director for the purposes of section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and is liable for short-swing
profits if it sells stock of the issuer corporation within six months of
purchase. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., [current] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,333, at 97,590 (2d Cir., Jan. 14, 1969).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted
to protect the public and "outside" stockholders from unfair use of
information by corporate "insiders" for short-swing speculation The
framers based liability on an objective measure of proof.' Section
16(b) liability attaches automatically to any profit0 by an insider on
any short-swing transaction within the six month time limit of the
statute." It is not necessary to show that the insider intended to profit
from the use of confidential information"2 or even that the insider was
privy to any confidential information; 3 nor is it a defense to show
that the corporation made a settlement. 4 The courts have broadly
join its board 22 months before Martin began accumulating Sperry stock; and no other Martin
man was ever mentioned for the position in the event Bunker absolutely declined.
7. Since the briefs did not agree as to the exact amount of profits from the sale, the case
was remanded to determine profits, with interest to be awarded at the discretion of the trial
court.
8. For a discussion of the background and effect of § 16(b), see Halleran & Calderwood,
Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEo. WAsti. L.
REv. 86, 115 (1959).
9. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943): "Mr. Corcoran, chief spokesman for the draftsmen and proponents of the [1934] Act,
[citations omitted], [stated] 'You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation
to sell the security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the
existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb.' "
This remark has been called the understatement of the 20th century. Halleran & Calderwood,
supra note 8, at 115.
10. Since the insider is required to disgorge the profits realized and the attorney is entitled
to fees payable out of the amount recovered by the corporation, Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), and the plaintiff need not be a
stockholder at the time of the alleged insider transaction (see note 16 infra), some attorneys will
search for violations through the monthly trading reports required by § 16(a) of the 1934 Act
and then find a stockholder willing to sue. For text of § 16(a), see note 34 infra. One court
noted an attorney's numerous appearances. Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300, 304 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
I1. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), excludes a transaction
where "such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted
. . . or any transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt." For
such exemptions, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-4 to .16b-10 (1968).
12. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
13. Farraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959).
14. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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construed section 16(b) in order to give effect to the remedial
"interpretation most consistent with the legislative purpose''15 even
when that construction appears contrary to the literal meaning."
Although the majority in Rattner v. Lehman17 held that the other
partners were not required to account for partnership short-swing
profits realized by them from stock of a corporation in which one of
the partners was a director, Judge Learned Hand originated the
theory of deputization in his concurring opinion.1 8 In Blau v.
Lehman, 9 in dictum recognizing that 16(b) did not extend farther
than directors, officers and ten per cent shareholders,20 the Supreme
Court said that "Lehman Brothers, though a partnership, could for
purposes of section 16(b) be a 'director' . . . and function through a
deputy .... ,,2" The question of deputization is a factual question to
be resolved in each case,22 and appellate review is limited to whether
the lower court's ruling was "clearly erroneous", z3
In the instant case, the court looked to the district court's
findings of fact 24 and the evidence in the record to ascertain whether
15. Alder v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959) (liability imposed upon a director
at the time of the sale whether or not he was such at the time of the purchase).
16. E.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922); Stella v.. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956) (dictum; all doubts
resolved against insiders); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1954) (action allowed
by shareholder who acquired stock subsequent to the violation); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872,
873 (2d Cir. 1949) (person performing functions similar to officer held an officer); Park &
Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947)
(voluntary conversion of preferred to common stock held a purchase); Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (transfer between
corporate officers for pre-existing debt held a sale); Blau v. Albert, 157 F. Supp. 816, 818-19
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (2 year statute of limitations held not to run until shareholder could get
knowledge of transaction); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (stock
of parent in exchange for stock of subsidiary under simplification plan that permitted cash
instead of stock held a purchase); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(dictum; a receipt of warrants by an officer pursuant to his contract described as a purchase).
17. 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
18. 193 F.2d at 567: "1 agree that § 16(b) does not go so far; but I wish to say nothing
as to whether, if a firm deputed a partner to represent its interests as a director on the board,
the other partners would not be liable."
19. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
20. 368 U.S. at 410-11; cf. Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 263
(2d Cir. 1959).
21. 368 U.S. at 409.
22. Id. at 408-09; Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (evidence insufficient to show that director was deputy of corp.).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). After considering all the evidence, the court may reverse if it is
firmly convinced that a mistake was committed. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 702 (1962).
24. See note 6 supra.
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or not those findings were clearly erroneous. 5 Recognizing that the
chief executive officer approves all of the firm's financial investments,
the court noted that with his position on the issuer corporation's
board, he could. utilize insider information for the benefit of his
corporation without disclosing such information to other personnel;
thus, he could be a deputy "even in the absence of factors indicating
an intention or belief on the part of both companies that he was so
acting. '26 The court felt that the letter of resignation indicated that
the director served as a representative of the defendant corporation. 2
In addition, the court interpreted the acquiring corporation's approval
of its officer's directorship as supporting the inference of deputization,
even though such approval was required by its organizational policy.
As further support of the same inference, the court noted that the
defendant had placed deputies with similar functions on other
corporate boards for the purpose of representing its interest. The
court held that section 16(b) was applicable even though the officer
was not a director when the stock was sold since the statutory
exemption of transactions where one is not a beneficial owner both at
the time of purchase and sale applies only to ten per cent shareholders
and not to officers and directors. The court also held SEC Rule 16A-
10 to be invalid to the extent that it exempts a transaction from the
operation of section 16(b) where a director resigns his post before the
sale in order to evade the reporting requirement of section 16(a).29
Until now there have been no restrictions on corporate
ownership of less than ten per cent of another company's stock. The
holding in the instant case that a corporation can be a director for the
purposes of section 16(b) raises many new problems ° Section 16(b)
25. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,333, at 97,590, 97,592 n.2 (2d Cir. Jan. 14,
1969).
26. Id. at 97,593.
27. Bunker's letter of resignation to General MacArthur, the chairman of the Sperry
Board of Directors stated: "When I became a member of the Board in April, it appeared to
your associates that the Martin Marietta ownership of a substantial number of shares of Sperry
Rand should have representation on your Board. The representation does not seem to me really
necessary, and I prefer not to be involved in the affairs of Sperry Rand when there are so many
other demands on my time. ... Id. at 9Z,593.
28. See the final sentence of § 16(b) in note 2 supra. See also 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1060 (2d ed. 1961).
29. Prior case law held that a purchase before appointment as a director, followed by a
sale within 6 months of purchase but after being appointed a director was subject to liability
under § 16(b). Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
30. See Stabler, Firms as 'Insiders': Concerns Buying Stock in Other Corporations Face
New Legal Peril, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1969, at I, col. 6 (St7. ed.), where the far-reaching
ramifications were described as "'a whole new can of worms." For a suggestion of problems of
legal ethics which may arise under 16(b), see note 10 supra.
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liability was based on objective criteria to avoid the problem of
proving intent or actual unfair use of inside information. The court
here, however, has impaired the application of section 16(b) by
introducing similar evidentiary problems in requiring a factual
demonstration of deputization.3 1 Certainty of application under
section 16(b) has been moved dahgerously close to the uncertainty
prevalent in proceedings under section 10(b) where the courts have
imposed liability on insiders without the benefit of congressionally
sanctioned standards 2 In addition to the uncertainty introduced, it
seems rather unsoutnd to hinge the likelihood of utilization of inside
information on the deputization question. The court could have
achieved the same result by interpreting section 3(a)(7) to include a
corporation as the director and its executive officer as its agent.P As
was evidenced by this indirect manner of action, the court was
hesitant to recognize all the tacit problems created when one
corporation is a director of another.
One apparent result of the case is that the deputy's corporation
will be required to file insider trading reports under section 16(a) of
the 1934 Act 4 and to sign securities registration materials with the
concomitant liability for material misstatement or omissions in the
documents.35 Another effect of this decision is to deter corporate
31. Although the -court suggests that this decision serves the congressional purpose,
"legislative history indicates that the omission of any provision [requiring partners of a director
to account for profits realized by them] was intentional [, because an earlier draft] made liable
any person who acted on confidential information disclosed by a director, but such a provision
was eliminted from the statute as finally enacted." Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566 (2d
Cir. 1952).
32. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Note, Texas Gulf
Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications 22 VAND.L. REV. 359 (1969).
33. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1964), provides:
"The term 'director' means any director of a corporation or any person peforming similar
functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated."
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1964), provides: "The
term 'person' means an individual, a corporation, a partnership .... "
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964), provides:
"Every person who is . . . a director or an officer of the issuer . . . shall file . . . a statement
. . . of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and
. . . each calendar month thereafter, if, there has been a change in such ownership during such
month .... "
35. Liability is usually predicated on the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 17(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k, 77q,(1964), or Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10, 18, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78r,
78t (1964). Signing such statements can be costly. One court has even allowed punitive damages
against the president of the issuer corporation and the underwriter for material misstatements in
the offering circular. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
noted in 22 VAND. L. REV. - (1969).
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executives from serving on other boards3 While the instant case arose
in the context of an abortive merger attempt, equally perplexing
problems are presented by the presence of bank officers and
underwriters on the boards of many companies.3 7 The court responded
to a generally recognized need for guidance in this complex and
unclear area of securities law, but the adoption of an equivocal
standard, despite the intended objective operation of the statute to
avoid the very problems here introduced, emphasizes the need for a
definitive congressional statement.
36. Gartner, *Thanks, but . . .': Many Executives Reject Proffered Board Seats As Perils
of Post Mount, Wvall St. J., March 13, 1969, at 1, col. 6 (Sw. ed.).
37. Possibly deputization would be more difficult to demonstrate in these situations, yet in
the situation of a bank that requires a board position in exchange for the extension of credit to
an ailing concern, it would appear that the concept of deputizhtion would be applicable.
